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ABSTRACT
Petroleum fiscal regime has been a controversial issue in Nigerian economy. The basic issue is which regime will lead to the greatest benefit to the 
government without negatively affecting the performance of the international oil companies. Nigeria has in the past used different regime and had 
adopted the current price sliding royalty regime in 1996. The aim of this study is to examine how the new price sliding royalty affects the stake 
of government and contractors. This study adopts ex-post research design approach using data from various sources between 1980 and 2019. The 
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) regression approach was adopted for the data analysis. The unit root results reveal that the time series data 
consists of a mix of I(1) and I(0) variables. The ARDL bound cointegration test shows that all the variables specified in the models have long run 
relationship. Estimates from the models indicate that the royalty regime in the Deep Offshore and Inland Basin Production Sharing Contract has 
positive and significant impact on the stake of government in the long and short runs, but negative impact on the stake of contractors. Furthermore, 
the royalty regime has negative impact on contractors’ performance in the long run. However, the impact on the three fiscal indicators (oil revenue, 
government expenditure, and deficit-GDP ratio) is positive. The study therefore recommends the repeal of the Nigerian petroleum fiscal policy with 
the new price sliding royalty to encourage investment and development of the petroleum sector.
Keywords: Deepwater, Fiscal Sustainability, Government and Contractor Takes, Price Sliding, Royalty Regimes 
JEL Classifications: P28, O22, O38
1. INTRODUCTION
Oil companies are often confronted with the challenges of 
making investment decisions for projects under uncertain price 
conditions. Fiscal regimes are key factors in determining the 
success of investment decisions in an international oil and gas 
setting (Isehunwa and Uzoalor, 2011; Okoro et al., 2017). In most 
fiscal regimes there are two key participants, an international oil 
company (IOC) and the host government national oil company 
(NOC). A common type in recent years is the production sharing 
contracts (PSCs) fiscal regime, where the oil resource is owned 
by the host government and the international oil company 
undertakes all risks as well as the associated cost of the entire 
exploration process, while the production is split at an agreed 
rate (Mingming et al., 2012). This has been adopted by Nigeria 
government as the appropriate upstream petroleum contract regime 
for offshore and inland basin development, since it would not 
bring about any financial burden on the government like the joint 
venture (Ogunleye, 2015; Mamudu et al., 2019). Before the early 
1990s, Nigeria has witnessed two eras of PSC as the contractual 
framework in the Nigerian Petroleum Industry (1973, 1993 and 
post 1993 PSCs). 
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The Federal Government of Nigeria in their response to the 
demand of stable regulations for foreign investments in the 
Petroleum Industry deepwater development enacted the Deep 
Offshore and Inland Basin Production Sharing Contract Act on 
March 23, 1999 (Lukman, 2000). The main contract elements 
include royalty, cost oil, profit oil and income tax. There are two 
common types of royalty applied in PSCs and they are price and 
production royalty sliding regimes. Sliding scales imply a scale 
in which royalty, varies in accordance with crude oil price or 
production output, meaning that within a certain range of oil price 
or production the royalty is the same and as the range of the oil 
price or production fluctuates royalty slides into a new rate (Iledare, 
2010). The basic idea of a sliding scale is to capture uncertainty 
during the project life irrespective of whether this uncertainty is 
technical or commercial (Wang et al., 2010). It is a rule of thumb 
that when oil price increases, more investment, expansion, and 
exploration activities are carried out. The opposite is true with 
lower oil prices. Figure 1 shows the oil field development (oil 
wells completed) and active rigs counts in Nigeria between 1995 
and 2018 with respect to the spot crude oil price. The stacked 
area plot (Figure 1) shows the relationship between the active rig 
count, oil wells complete and crude oil price over 23 years. The 
trend shows that the field development and number of active rigs 
increase as oil price increases. This shows that the more money 
the IOCs make from their PSC agreement, the more they re-invest 
for other field development.
Royalty is one of the most basic elements of PSCs, and literature 
has shown that among the two types (price and production royalty 
sliding regimes), the production royalty sliding regime promotes 
increase in production and development of medium fields. 
According to an evaluation by Gowharzad and Al-Harthy (2011) 
of the different methods of calculating a production royalty sliding 
scale, the elements in these legal instrument provides and protects 
the interest of both host government and contractor. In other words, 
the contractor pays less royalty for small fields, which this is an 
incentive while more fields are developed for the host government. 
But, with the oil price-based sliding scale royalty regime the rates 
vary according to the crude oil prices (Adubisi et al., 2020). The 
oil price sliding scale approach was adopted by the Nigerian 
government in the fiscal legislation in Nigeria is the Deep Offshore 
and Inland Basin Production Sharing Contract (DOIBPSC) Act 
enacted in 1999 and amended in 2020. The royalty by price was 
adopted to enable the government capture windfall in oil price 
spike and also ignore royalty deduction when oil price is less than 
or equal to $ 20/barrel. IOCs are in a country to make profit and 
not merely recover their costs, thus there are several perceived 
disadvantages to the crude oil price-based royalty regimes. The 
IOC is extremely exposed to changes in hydrocarbon prices which 
affect revenue and recovery; thus, in a period of low prices, the IOC 
might be inclined to shut in hydrocarbon production and to wait 
for higher prices which can adversely affect field development.
A common assumption in upstream regime debate is that countries 
with large reserves can afford to impose whatever terms they 
desire and IOCs will continue to bang on the door requesting 
entry (Leighty and Lin, 2012; Smith, 2014). But, Russia and 
Brazil situations are examples of how IOCs can lose interest in a 
country where they have no protection against future opportunistic 
behaviour by its sovereign counterparty (Da Hora et al., 2019). 
This study examine the government and contractor takes in the new 
amended DOIBPSC Act by Nigeria government using econometric 
model. The results evaluate the effect of Nigerian petroleum fiscal 
policy with emphasis on the government and contractor takes and 
if the Act is part of resource nationalism. Stevens (2008) highlights 
that resource nationalism can define as relative bargaining power 
switch in favour of the host government which increases it fiscal 
take by changing the terms of the original contract, after discovery 
and investment sunk in development. The outcome also validates 
the effectiveness and appropriateness, of the policy and thereby 
contribute to the development of the Nigerian petroleum industry. 
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows: section 
2 gives an expose on different fiscal regimes, Section 3 presents 
and explains the method employed for the collection and analysis 
of the study data. Section 4 presents the results and discusses 
the empirical findings, while section 5 summarizes with policy 
recommendations.
2. FISCAL REGIME ELEMENTS
The two broad classifications of Petroleum Fiscal Arrangements are 
the concessionary and contractual systems. These systems are used 
to describe the legislative, tax, contractual and fiscal elements under 
which petroleum operations are conducted in a petroleum region 
Table 1: Petroleum fiscal regime of a typical concessionary 
system







Deductions: 35% 35% 63
Taxable income 117
Income tax rate 50% 58.5

































































Figure 1: Stacked Area Chart Relationship between Active Rigs count, 
Oil Wells completed and Crude Oil Price
Source: 1995 – 2019 OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin.
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or province (Dongkun and Na, 2010). From Table 1, it is clear that 
the basic elements of the concessionary system are gross revenue, 
royalty, deductions (capital expenditure and operating cost), and 
income tax rate allowed. Government take for Canada, the United 
States, and Australia are 58.36%, 72.74%, and 43.92% respectively, 
and their royalties are 27.5, 20%, and 6.25% respectively; while tax 
rates are 15%, 35%, and 30% (Phillips, 2008). Literature has shown 
that Australian petroleum fiscal policy is more attractive (Kraal, 
2017; Swe and Emodi, 2018). Australia allows for accelerated 
depreciation, immediate write off of exploration expenditure, 
research and development (R&D) incentive, and expenditure uplift. 
The concessionary system requires auditing and transparency, and 
it may be difficult to implement in developing countries. It could 
be fraught with gold-plating, over- invoicing, transfer pricing and 
low saving index (Kaiser, 2007; Abd Manaf et al., 2014).
In the pure service contract, the IOC is in business with the host 
government for a predetermined fee, which includes the cost of 
the investments. The IOC provides the financial, technical and 
managerial skill for the field development (Floricel and Lampel, 
1998). In the service contract with risk, the contractor provides all 
the technical, financial, and managerial skill, however, contractor is 
compensated out of profit, rather than from production, generated 
from the crude oil output, or a share of the revenue, or oil generated 
from the operations (Nasir and Hadikusumo, 2019). This implies 
that if no oil is generated, the contractor bears the cost. Price of 
oil can also be a serious challenge in this case. The buy-back 
contract was popular in Iran from the seventies to late eighties 
(Van Groenendaal and Mazraati, 2006). Under the Iranian model, 
the IOC enters into agreement with the national oil company 
to develop a field and the national oil company supervises the 
operations of the IOC. The oil produced from the operation is sold 
to the IOC at the international oil price under the crude oil sale 
agreement to cover the cost, expanses, and agreed upon profit of 
the project (Khah and Amiri, 2014). The IOC is also entitled to 
purchase 5% of the oil production at a discount as a reward for the 
risk taken, usually at 5% discount. If the operation is not successful, 
the contract is terminated and the IOC bears the loss. The main 
elements in the three strands of the PSC are presented in Table 2.
Table 2 shows that the basic and important elements of PSC include 
royalty, corporate income tax, cost oil, and profit sharing. Others 
are government participation, bonuses, environmental taxes and 
duties, and community liability. Except for the PSC and SC that are 
forms of contractual systems, the other arrangements are forms of 
the concessionary systems. Regardless of the system in place, the 
crux is on how to recover costs and share the profit, which is the 
“Economic Rent”: the difference between the value of production 
and the cost of extraction (Schwab and Werker, 2018; Schwerhoff 
et al., 2019).
Nigeria’s deep water licenses were first issued in the mid-1990s. 
Most of the assets were initially realized in the form of product 
sharing agreements (PSCs), while some were on a sole risk 
license basis. the promulgation of the Deep Offshore Inland Basin 
Production Sharing Contract (DOIBPSC) Act of 1999 converted 
all licenses in deep-water operations beyond 200 meters’ water 
depth to become a deep offshore asset. Interestingly, this law was 
enacted and back-dated to 1993 so as to cover assets approved at 
the time. Prior to the amendments to the DOIBPSC law in Nigeria, 
the governing royalty schemes for deep offshore assets progress 
with water depth. The Act fixed a royalty rate of 12 percent for 
assets mined between 201 and 500 meters; 8% for assets between 
501 and 800 meters; 4% flat royalty rate for oil production from 
assets at water depth of 801-1000 meters. There is no flat royalty 
rate for assets in water depth more than 1000 meters. A fixed 
royalty rate means that the calculated rate is stable regardless of 
the production volume from the asset (Clancy, 2007). In addition, 
although the previous DOIBPSC law included a clause that could 
trigger a windfall profit capture to the economic rent; but the 
amended version of the DOIBPSC Act provides a 10 percent 
fixed royalty rate for all deep offshore production in water depths 
more than 200 meters. As a result, many large offshore deep-water 
facilities operating at depths of more than 1,000 meters are subject 
to royalties.
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
This section explains the method employed for data collection 
and analysis in this study.
Table 2: Production sharing contract models
Elements Indian model Indonesian model Peruvian model
Determined using
Royalty 1st 7 years=5% No Production sliding scale,
after 7 years=10% RRE & R-factor
Companies Income Tax 40% 25% 32%
Ring Fencing No No No
Cost oil 100% 100% No
Profit oil Biddable 57% NOC, 43% IOC RSC-70% NOC, 30% IOC.
Dep. Accelerated Accelerated Straight line (20%)
New invest. 15% Investment credit (8.8%)
Incentives Yes - Yes
R&D Yes - Yes
Tax holiday Before 2017 No No
Site restoration Yes Interest recovery, VAT Reimbursement Vat recovery
Losses Carried fwd.(8 years) Carried. fwd.(10 years) Carried. fwd. (without limit)
Domestic Market Obligation NO 25% No
FTO No 20% (NOC&IOC according to Agreement) No
Source: Authors’ Computations from Global Oil and Gas Tax Guide, 2018
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3.1. Model Specification
We specify the empirical model of the relationship between the 
Deep Offshore Inland Basin Production Sharing Contract royalty 
regime with respect to the IOC and government’s stake implicitly as:
 NPIOCi = f(OO, OPR, PV, RTY) (1)
 NPNOCI = f(OO, OPR, PV, RTY) (2)
Where NPIOCi is net profit per barrel of the IOC or the contractor 
take, NPNOCI is the net profit per barrel of the national oil 
company or the government’s stake, OO is oil output, OPR is the 
oil price, RTY is royalty level per barrel, and PV is the royalty 
regime (the policy variable). The first model enables us examine 
the impact of the royalty regime on the contactors’ take; while the 
second model examines the impact of the royalty regime on the 
government’s stake. The implicit model specified in equations (1) 
and (2) are transformed explicitly as:
 NPIOCi=λ0+λ1 OOi+λ2 OPRi+λ3 PVi +λ4 RTYi+μi (3)
 NPNOCI=β0+β1 OOi+β2 OPRi+β3 PVi+β4RTYi+μi (4)
Where, NPIOC, NPNOC, OO, OPR and PV are as earlier defined. 
λ0 is constant term; λ1, λ2, λ3 are coefficients of the various variables 
and measures the marginal effect of the oil output, oil price, and the 
royalty regime respectively on the contractors’ take, whereas μ1 is a 
stochastic error term. On the other hand, β0 is a constant term which 
measures the level of the government take when other variables 
influences area are at zero level. β1, β2, β3 are the coefficients of 
the variables in the government take model (equation 4) and also 
measures the marginal impact of the oil output, oil price, and the 
royalty regime respectively on the government’s take.
To identify the effect of the Deep Offshore Inland Basin Production 
Sharing Contract royalty regime on the contractors and the 
government performance, we deploy three fiscal performance 
indicators: oil revenue, government expenditure, and deficit-GDP 
ratio.
The empirical model for the effect of the royalty regime on 
contractor’s performance is stated explicitly as:
 OOi=γ0+γ1 NPIOCi+γ2 OPRi+γ3 PVi+γ4 RTYi+εi (5)
The empirical model for the royalty regime impact on government’s 
performance is stated as:
For government revenue
 ORGi=ϕ0+ϕ1 NPIOCi+ϕ2 OPRi+ϕ3 PVi+ϕ4 RTYI+εi (6)
For government expenditures:
 GEXPi=ψ0+ψ1 NPIOCi+ψ2 OPRi+ψ3 PVi+ψ4 RTYi+εi (7)
For government Deficit-GDP ratio
 GDii=χ0+χ1 NPIOCi+χ2 OPRi+χ3 PVi+χ4 RTYi+εi (8)
Where, ORGi, GEXPii, GDii are government oil revenue, 
government expenditure, and fiscal deficit –GDP ratio. γ1, γ2, γ3 
are parameters measuring the effect of IOC take, oil price, and 
royalty regime on IOC oil output.
3.2. Nature and Sources of Data
Data for the analysis are secondary in nature and they consist 
of annual time series of the variables in the model. Data were 
collected from 1980 to 2019. Data for government oil revenue, 
government deficit-GDP ratio, and government total expenditure 
were collected from the Central bank of Nigeria Statistical 
bulletin. Data for oil price, and oil output were collected from 
the OPEC Annual Statistical bulletin (various issues) and BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy June 2019. Contractors’ take 
was calculated as 35% of profit oil; while government take is 
65% of profit oil. Royalty regime was represented as a dummy 
variable which takes the value of “0” before the introduction 
of price sliding royalty (royalty by price), 1980-1995, and “1” 
thereafter, 1996-2019. The royalty for the two periods were 
calculated accordingly.
3.3. Method of Data Analysis
The study adopted the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) 
econometric regression techniques developed by Pesaran et al. 
(2001) to analyze the data because of its inherent advantages 
over the traditional approaches (Sahoo and Das, 2012; Adeleye 
et al., 2020a,b; Okoye et al., 2020). One advantage of the 
ARDL- Bound test approach is that it can be applied in case of 
fractional mixed order of integration [I(0) and I(1)]. However, 
it breaks down in the presence I(2) series and it is efficient in 
small sample and requires just one equation for both long run 
and the short run. 
3.3.1. Unit root test
Kirchgässner et al. (2013) observed that time series data are 
fraught with unit root. They argue that estimating a time series 
model without treating the data for unit root will likely produce 
spurious results. The study adopted the augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) approach to unit root investigation. However, 
several studies have highlighted the need to compliment 
the ADF approach (Xiao and Phillips, 1998; Libanio, 2005; 
Adeleye et al., 2020a,b); thus, the ADF was complemented with 
Phillips-Perron test.
3.4. ARDL/Bound Cointegration Test
The functional form of the ARDL-bounds cointegration model 
for this study is specified as follows:
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Where, ∆Y is the first difference operator of dependent variable, α1, 
and β’are long-run parameters, ηi and θ’ are short-run parameters 
to be estimated; Yt–1 is the lagged dependent variable while Xt–1 
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is the vector of explanatory variables, and vt is the error term that 
is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d). So, in one 
equation we have an estimator that captures both the short- and 
long run impact of the variables.
The empirical bounds F-statistics obtained from the cointegration 
test is compared with the critical values of the upper and lower 
bounds at the 5% probability level. If the empirical F-statistics 
is greater than the upper critical value for I(1) series, the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected at the 5% probability 
level but if the empirical F-statistics is less than the lower critical 
value of I(0) series, then, the null hypothesis is maintained (Pesaran 
et al., 2001). It is only when there is cointegration that the long 
run parameters can be estimated. Otherwise, only the short run 
estimations suffice.
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1. Unit Root Test
The results of the unit root test the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) and the Phillips- Perron (PP) procedures are presented in 
Table 3. Findings show that the variables are of mixed level of 
integration.
The ADF unit root test in Table 3 shows that the fiscal deficit-GDP 
ratio (GD), government expenditure (GEXP) and contractors take 
(NPIOC) are stationary at their levels, which implies that they 
are I(0) series. Oil price (OPR), royalty (RTY), oil output (OO), 
oil revenue (ORG), and government take were not stationary at 
level, an indication that they have unit root. However, they became 
stationary after 1st differencing (I(1) series). On the other hand, 
results from the Phillips-Perron test indicated that only oil output 
(OO) and contractors take are stationary at level. Other variables 
became stationary after 1st differencing. Thus, this study has a mix 
of I(1) and I(0) series in the model. The results indicate that the 
ARDL-Bound test cointegration procedure is the most appropriate 
method for examining cointegration among the integrated series.
4.2. ARDL/Bounds Cointegration Test
The results of ARDL-bounds cointegration tests for the models/ 
equations are presented in Table 4. The results show that all the 
models are cointegrated and implies that there is a stable long-run 
relationship among the variables in each of the models. If the variables 
are cointegrated, their long run coefficient can, therefore, be estimated.
4.3. Impact of Price Sliding Royalty on Contractor and 
Government Takes
This section presents a comparative analysis of the impact of price 
sliding royalty (royalty by price) regime on host government and 
contractor takes in the long and short run. The regression results 
tabulated in Table 5 shows the long-run impact of the price sliding 
royalty regime on the host government’s and contractors’ stakes. 
First, the result indicates that there is a positive difference between 
the royalty regime before royalty by price regime and after its 
introduction. The positive sign of the policy variable coefficient 
(PV) indicates that the current regime is impacting more on the 
takes now than before the introduction of the price sliding royalty 
regime. However, the change in royalty regime is not significant 
for both the host government and contractors.
The royalty payout by the IOC (RTY) has negative impact on the 
contractors take, but the impact is not significant in the long run. 
However, the price sliding royalty regime had significant positive 
contribution to government take. This implies that there is a transfer 
of surplus from contractors to the host government. That is, the royalty 
by price regime (price sliding royalty) increased the host government 
take through the economic rent from the oil resources. According to 
Yang et al. (2017), the negative impact on contractors’ stake would 
decrease their financial investments due to conservative capacity 
strategy. On the other hand, it makes the host government suffer 
from new capital intensive project shortage from the IOCs because 
capital investment is the key decision influencing exploration and 
production (E&P) industry business and it requires substantial capital 
resources from the contractor. Another very important variable is the 
oil price (OPR), which has a positive and significant impact on both 
parties. The analysis shows that the government will benefit from 
all output levels. The costs of finding and developing petroleum and 
mineral resources can be enormous and to meet expected returns on 
investment, contractors will be attracted to fiscal regimes that provide 
for early pay-back of these up-front costs (Daniel et al., 2010).








OPR –2.312835 –7.09558** –2.250076 –7.207769**
OO –3.303501 –5.678877** –3.579678* -
RTY –2.390448 –6.286575** –2.320222 –6.589332**
ORG –1.892841 –6.879179** –1.983439 –6.906524**
GD –3.677331* - –3.439217 15.99685**
GEXP –4.666724* - –3.12831 –7.477777**
NPIOC –5.284372* - –5.300562* -
NPNOC –2.287138 –7.472131** –2.198647 –7.746986**
RESERV –1.039973 –4.702829** –1.580249 –4.778209**
Source: Authors’ computations. *Indicate significance at level. **Indicates significance 
at 1st difference. 1%=–4.211868, 5%=–3.529758, 10%=–3.196411
Table 4: ARDL/bounds cointegration test
Model Equation Sample size (n) No. of Variables (k) F-Statistic 5% Upper critical Bound Remarks
NPIOC 3.3 35 4 10.2041 4.544 Cointegrated
NPNOC 3.4 37 4 8.2716 5.594 Cointegrated
OO 3.5 37 4 5.9338 5.226 Cointegrated
ORG 3.6 35 4 6.4533 4.57 Cointegrated
GEXP 3.7 35 4 5.7904 5.07 Cointegrated
GD 3.8 35 4 8.7101 5.304 Cointegrated
Source: Authors’ computations
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Table 8: Long run impact of price sliding royalty regime on fiscal performances
Variable Oil revenue Gov. Exp. Fiscal deficit
Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value
OPR 74.8992 0.0000 0.5792 0.2367 –0.1563 0.0895
RTY 950.0664 0.0401 2.5935 0.7327 3.9881 0.0327
PV 3761.9470 0.0002 51.2245 0.3037 3.9024 0.0545
OO 6.7287 0.0000 –0.0864 0.2444 0.0044 0.0895
Source: Authors’ computations
Having seen the long run impact, Table 6 shows the results from the 
short run analysis. The short run impact of the price sliding royalty 
regime is not significantly different from the long run impact. 
In the short run, all the coefficients are positive and significant. 
However, the short run impact on government is lower than the 
long run impact for the royalty level and the regime change. The 
short run impact of the royalty level and the regime change on the 
contractors is higher and significantly negative. This is expected 
since the royalty regime is based on long term benefits in oil 
and gas industry. The analysis on the price sliding scale royalty 
regime shows that the amended Deep Offshore and Inland Basin 
Production Sharing Contract (DOIBPSC) Act ultimate goal is to 
increase government take both for long and short run.
The contractors in the long-run will adjust and reduce some of the 
negative impact by restructuring, closing unproductive wells, and 
even divesting in some areas. Cost Recovery is unique approach 
for long-run adjustments, because it comprises one of two ways 
through which the contractor’s share usually gets determined, that 
is, the cost oil and the profit oil split (Blake and Roberts, 2006). 
Oil price has higher impact on both the contractor and the host 
government takes. Oil output has positive and significant impact 
on the contractor and government takes in the short run.
4.4. Impact of Price Sliding Royalty on Contractor’s 
Output
The long and short-run impact of the price sliding royalty regime 
on the performance of contractors in terms of output is presented 
in Table 7. The table shows the contraction in the short and long 
run impact of the regime on the contractors’ performance. In the 
long run, impact of the price sliding regime (PV) is negative and 
statistically significant. The impact of the royalty level (RTY) on 
output capacity is also negative and significant. This implies that 
the price sliding royalty regime has negative long run effect on the 
contractor’s take, thus, reducing the amount of cash available for 
the contractor. It could lead to divestment in other E&P industry 
projects and development.
The short run effect of the price sliding regime and the level of 
royalty is positive and significant. Contractor can still bear the 
brunt in the short run, but this is not sustainable in the long run 
because the goal of a fiscal system from a government’s point of 
view is to attract investment (Nakhle, 2008; Blinn et al., 2009). 
Output will be adjusted in the long run to accommodate the higher 
rates of the royalty and higher government take, because the law 
of supply indicates that output will fall in the long run. Oil price 
has positive impact on output in the long run, but negative in the 
short run. Mingming et al. (2012) also observed similar trends in 
PSC analysis based on an oil price stochastic process approach.
Table 8 presents the long run impact of the price sliding royalty 
regime on fiscal performance of the host government (Nigeria) 
during the period under review. Table 8 reveals that oil revenue 
Table 7: Long run and short run impact of price sliding royalty regime on contractors performance (output)
Variable Long run Variable Short run
Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value
OPR 1.3111 0.8167 OPR(–1) –7.2449 0.0015
RTY –215.8709 0.1701 RTY(–1) 398.2978 0.0000
PV –825.6021 0.0454 PV(–4) 741.2794 0.0001
RESERV 80.8592 0.0107 RESERV(–2) 41.7658 0.0727
Source: Authors’ computations
Table 6: Short run impact of price sliding royalty regime 
on government and contractors takes





OPR(–3) 0.1181 0.0010 OPR(–3) 0.322 0.001
RTY(–1) 2.1204 0.0001 RTY(–1) –12.7293 0.0001
PV(–4) 2.578 0.0016 PV(–4) –16.8896 0.0033
OO(–4) 0.0212 0.0033 OO(–4) 0.0218 0.0033
Source: Authors’ computations
Table 5: Long-run impact of price sliding royalty regime 
on government and contractors’ stakes





OPR 0.0343* 0.0005 0.1446* 0.0043
RTY 3.9582* 0.0025 –0.6688 0.6546 
PV 7.9592 0.1392 0.7104 0.8128
OO 0.0046* 0.0016 –0.0078* 0.028
Source: Authors’ computations. *5%, significance level
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accruable to the government consequent upon the introduction 
of the royalty regime increased during the period under review. 
The sliding regime, PV, is positive and significant which implies 
that the introduction of the policy regime induced positive effect 
on the government oil revenue. Also, royalty has positive and 
significant impact on the government oil revenue. This is expected 
because of the positive impact of the oil price sliding scale royalty 
regime. Both oil price and oil output have positive impact on 
the government oil revenue during the period under review. The 
finding of Gab-Leyba and Laporte (2016) also supports the findings 
in this study because their study revealed that oil extraction sector 
can generate considerable income through economic rent while 
providing incentives for exploration.
The royalty by price regime had positive impact on government 
expenditure to GDP ratio. This variable measures the size of the 
government. What this implies is that the policy regime increased 
the size of the government during the period under review. 
The level of the royalty from the IOC contributed positively to 
government size during the period under review. The oil price was 
also found to have positive impact on the size of the government; 
but, oil output had negative impact on the size of the government. 
Aguilera (2014) also indicated the evidence of a relationship 
between oil prices and oil output. The non-significant impact of 
price sliding royalty regime on the account of government size 
could be explained by the growing size of the GDP relative to the 
host government expenditure.
The policy regime has positive and significant impact on 
government fiscal system sustainability. Likewise, the level of 
royalty from the IOCs improved the fiscal sustainability index 
during the period under review. However, oil price had negative 
impact on fiscal sustainability in the long run. This is not 
unexpected as the volatility in oil price always led to short fall 
in expected oil revenue, incessant borrowing, over spending and 
inability to maintain fiscal discipline. Forecasting of oil price is a 
difficult task for long-term investments and uncertainty should not 
be ignored as stressed by Larsson and Nossman (2011).
The study observed that the price sliding royalty regime favour 
the host government’s take better than the IOCs. It increased 
oil revenue for the government and fiscal system sustainability 
in the long run, and this implies that price sliding scale royalty 
protects the host government interests. Thus, mutually beneficial 
contracts between the contractor and host government cannot be 
achieved at high oil price using price sliding royalty regime. There 
is also concern that royalties can induce inefficient investment, 
depletion and operation strategies. A high royalty rate linked 
to output, for example, may cause premature suspension or 
abandonment of production as a result of its insensitivity to the 
declining profit margins when the oil field production continues 
to decline (Mortenson and Pitre, 2018; Avinadav, 2020). This can 
have a negative impact on new hydrocarbon field exploration 
and development since direct investment from the contractor is 
required to develop these natural resources. Literature has shown 
the need for government to provide a more flexible tax policy 
so as to encourage investments in hydrocarbon exploration and 
production (Camen et al., 2020). Contractors have a strong and 
legitimate interest in a stable and reasonably predictable fiscal 
environment.
5. CONCLUSION
This study adopted ex-post research design approach using 
econometric method of data analysis. Consequently, secondary 
data were collected from various sources (OPEC Annual Statistical 
Bulletin, BP Statistical Review of World Energy, and Central 
Bank of Nigeria Annual Bulletin) from 1980 to 2019 Three fiscal 
performance indicators were employed to evaluate the impact of the 
price sliding royalty regime on the performance of the government. 
Specifically, the indicators are government oil revenue, government 
expenditure, and government fiscal deficit -GDP ratio. The 
Pesaran et al. (2001) autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model 
regression approach was adopted for estimating the models.
Our findings reveal that in both the long-run and short-run, the 
price sliding (royalty by price) regime had negative impact on the 
contractor’s take. But, the royalty by price regime had positive 
and significant impact on the stake of government for the period 
under review. The impact of the royalty by price regime on the 
performance of the contractor in terms of output was found to be 
positive, and significant in the short run. Nonetheless, the long 
run impact was observed to be highly negative and significant. 
The impact of the royalty regime and volume of output on the 
fiscal performance was positive for the three indicators such as 
oil revenue, government size and fiscal sustainability. Though, the 
impact on government size was not significant.
The conclusion from the study, based on the result from the data 
analysis, is that the price sliding royalty regime in the Nigerian 
petroleum fiscal policy for the Deep Offshore Inland Basin 
Production Sharing Contract (DOIBPSC) is not favourable to the 
IOCs. It is a deliberate scheme to increase the government share of the 
economic rent from the oil resources. The current Nigerian petroleum 
fiscal policy in the Deep Offshore Inland Basin Production Sharing 
Contract is designed for fiscal consolidation and fiscal sustainability. 
The price sliding royalty regime transfers surplus from the contractor 
to the government. It is more of a redistributive policy than a policy 
designed for the growth and development of the oil sector. Long term 
application of the policy may lead to a large-scale divestment in the 
oil sector, with Nigeria sliding further downward in oil production 
league in Africa. There is the need for urgent repeal of the Nigeria 
petroleum fiscal policy, especially, with respect to PSC to reflect 
current realities and world’s best practices.
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